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Blockchain Entity Resolution: Common-Input Ownership, CEX Deposit Reuse & False-Positive Guards

Grouping raw cryptographic addresses into real-world entities differs fundamentally between UTXO chains (Bitcoin Common-Input Ownership) and Account-model EVM chains (CEX Deposit-Address Reuse).

By Dr. Devon Kurosawa, PhDReview not recorded · Updated
Blockchain Entity Resolution: Common-Input Ownership, CEX Deposit Reuse & False-Positive Guards — NFTVenue Ledger 2026 quantitative & supervisory data card
NFTVenue Ledger (MiCA Title VI Market Abuse Surveillance, Wash-Trade Filtering & Graph Forensics): Guarded CEX deposit-forwarder sweeps, CoinJoin filters, and hard-vs-soft Union-Find.Source: NFTVenue Ledger Institutional Research DeskLicense: CC-BY-4.0

Every compliance graph in digital-asset surveillance starts with Entity Resolution (Wallet Clustering): collapsing 500,000,000 raw hexadecimal strings down into Entity Clusters C_1, C_2, ..., C_M controlled by the same underlying person, market maker, or VASP! Yet UTXO chains (Bitcoin, Litecoin) and Account-model chains (Ethereum, Solana, Arbitrum, Base) require completely different mathematical heuristics (Meiklejohn et al. 2013 for UTXO; Friedhelm Victor 2020 for EVM)—and applying naive rules without Privacy/Smart-Account Exception Guards creates catastrophic false merges ("Monster Clusters")!

Anchored in our MiCA Title VI market abuse & wash-trading master guide, mastering deterministic vs probabilistic clustering empowers surveillance analysts across venues in our marketplaces directory (from Binance and Bakkt Market to on-chain DEXs) under FATF Recommendation 15 and ESMA STOR investigations.

Heuristic Family #1 (UTXO): Common-Input Ownership (CIOH) — And the CoinJoin / PayJoin Trap!#

In Bitcoin, when Alice wants to pay 3.0 BTC to Bob using two 2.0 BTC UTXOs sitting in Addr_1 and Addr_2, her wallet constructs one transaction with 2 inputs (Addr_1, Addr_2) signed by both private keys:

  • Classic Common-Input Ownership Heuristic (CIOH): "All input addresses co-spent inside a single Bitcoin transaction belong to the same entity."
  • CRITICAL EXCEPTION (CoinJoin / Wasabi / JoinMarket / PayJoin BIP-78): In a CoinJoin (where 50 strangers coordinate to co-sign 1 giant transaction with 50 equal 0.1 BTC outputs!) or a BIP-78 PayJoin (where the merchant contributes 1 of their own UTXOs as an input alongside the customer's input!), CIOH IS 100% FALSE! If your Union-Find clustering script fails to pre-filter CoinJoin transactions (detected via >=3 equal-value outputs + high Boltzmann entropy), 1 single CoinJoin merges 50 unrelated strangers—and all their historical wallets—into one corrupted "Monster Cluster"!
Guarded Union-Find blockchain entity-resolution pipeline across UTXO CIOH and EVM CEX Deposit-Forwarder Reuse
Guarded Union-Find blockchain entity-resolution pipeline across UTXO CIOH and EVM CEX Deposit-Forwarder ReuseVerified Exhibit

Heuristic Family #2 (EVM Account Model): Exchange Deposit-Address Reuse (Victor 2020)!#

Ethereum transactions have only 1 msg.sender per transaction (zero multi-input co-spends!). How, then, do Chainalysis, Elliptic, TRM, and Arkham cluster millions of Ethereum/Solana EOAs with >99% precision? Trace how every major centralized exchange (Binance, Coinbase, Kraken, OKX, Bybit) manages user deposits:

  1. User KYC Account #88219 clicks "Deposit ETH / ERC-20" -> the CEX assigns a dedicated Deposit Forwarder Address D_88219 (either an EOA or minimal EIP-1167 clone).
  2. Whenever tokens land in D_88219, an automated CEX sweeper forwards 100% straight into the known CEX Omnibus Hot Wallet H_CEX (with zero outbound transfers from D_88219 to anywhere EXCEPT H_CEX!).
  3. The Golden Clustering Rule: If personal hardware wallet W_1, DeFi hot wallet W_2, and NFT burner wallet W_3 all send funds into the exact same dedicated Deposit Address D_88219, then {W_1, W_2, W_3} belong to KYC Account #88219!
  4. Vital False-Positive Exclusion!: What if KYC Account #88219 belongs to an OTC Broker, Merchant Payment Gateway (Coinbase Commerce / BitPay), or Staking Pool where 500 customers deposit into D_88219?! Always enforce Maximum Fan-In Degree Cap (inDegree(D) <= 15–25 EOAs) AND exclude swap routers (because if you swap ETH -> USDC on Uniswap specifying recipient = D_88219, UniswapPair appears as the ERC-20 sender!)!

Entity-Resolution Heuristics: Confidence Tier & Pitfall Matrix#

Quantitative Distribution · Evidentiary Tier
Evidentiary TierMandatory Engineering Guardrail
01CEX Deposit-Forwarder ReuseTier 1 (Determi…02UTXO Co-Spend (CIOH)Tier 1 (~96% w/…03Cross-EVM EOA Key ReuseTier 1 (100% fo…04Self-Authoritative MetadataTier 1 (Bidirec…
Clustering HeuristicChain ModelEvidentiary TierFatal False-Positive Trap (If Unguarded!)Mandatory Engineering Guardrail
CEX Deposit-Forwarder ReuseEVM / Solana / TronTier 1 (Deterministic ~99.4%)OTC broker deposit address or swap(to=deposit)!Cap inDegree(D) <= 20 + check tx.from (exclude AMM Pairs!)
UTXO Co-Spend (CIOH)Bitcoin / UTXOTier 1 (~96% w/ filter)CoinJoin / PayJoin / Lightning Dual-FundReject txs with >=3 equal outputs or Whirlpool structure
Cross-EVM EOA Key ReuseETH / Arb / Base / OPTier 1 (100% for EOAs)Smart-Contract CREATE Nonce Collision (Wintermute OP bug!)Verify extcodesize == 0 (EOA) or identical CREATE2 salt!
Self-Authoritative MetadataAll (ENS / Farcaster)Tier 1 (Bidirectional)Unidirectional reverse-record spoofing!Require Forward AND Reverse ENS/protocol signature match!
Entity clustering precision and Monster-Cluster contamination rate across raw vs guarded EVM Deposit-Reuse algorithms
Entity clustering precision and Monster-Cluster contamination rate across raw vs guarded EVM Deposit-Reuse algorithmsVerified Exhibit

Formal Set-Predicate Definition of a Valid CEX Deposit Forwarder (D)#

Look closely at Metric #1 (Hard vs Soft Graph): institutional graph architectures (Chainalysis Reactor, TRM) NEVER put probabilistic behavioral guesses (like gas-price similarity) into permanent transitive Disjoint-Set Union-Find (because just 0.5% false edges trigger a phase-transition Giant Component collapsing the graph!). Only Tier-1 Deterministic Predicates enter Union-Find:

Formula or model from the articleNot independently verified
1) Formal Predicate Defining a Personal CEX Deposit Forwarder Address D (Victor 2020 Hardened):
  • IsPersonalDepositForwarder(D, HotWallets HCEX, RouterSet RDEX) <=>
  • (a) AllOutflowsToSameCEX: For 100% of outgoing transfers (D -> y): y in H_CEX
  • (b) SweepLatencyBounded: Median( tsweep(D -> HCEX) - t_deposit(x -> D) ) <= 86,400s
  • (c) BoundedPersonalFanIn: 2 <= | { x notin (HCEX union R_DEX) : (x -> D) } | <= 20
  • Deterministic Entity Merge Rule:
  • For every verified D, merge only INITIATING EOA senders u where (tx.from == u AND Transfer(u -> D) AND u notin RDEX):
  • Union( u1, u2 ) for all u1, u2 in VerifiedSenders(D)

Auditing DAO Governance Bribe Markets & Vote-Buying Manipulation Next#

Beyond spot markets and industrial airdrop Sybil Louvain clustering, multi-billion-dollar DeFi protocols allocate emissions and collateral parameters via on-chain token governance—where external "Bribe Marketplaces" (Votium, Hidden Hand, Paladin) allow anyone to pay veToken holders per vote! When is gauge bribing efficient liquidity routing, and when does vote-buying cross into predatory governance extraction? Analyze convex vote markets next in governance bribe markets & vote-buying convexity manipulation inside our MiCA Title VI Market Abuse hub.

Frequently asked questions

How does swapping directly into a Binance deposit address from Uniswap break naive clustering scripts?

When Alice calls UniswapRouter.exactInputSingle(..., recipient = AliceBinanceDeposit), the ERC-20 Transfer event shows UniswapPool -> AliceBinanceDeposit! A naive script merges UniswapPool with Alice—and then merges UniswapPool across 100,000 other users!

What is a "Monster Cluster" in blockchain graph forensics?

Because Disjoint-Set Union-Find is transitive (A=B and B=C implies A=C), a single false-positive hub (like an unlabeled OTC desk, CoinJoin, or DEX router) fuses hundreds of thousands of unrelated wallets into one giant unusable supernode.

Why must ENS or identity linkage check BOTH forward and reverse resolution?

Anyone can configure an address record pointing a domain they bought AT a celebrity address (unidirectional); cryptographic ownership is proven ONLY when the target address itself signs the reverse-registrar record pointing back!

Does the same 0x... Ethereum address always belong to the same owner on Arbitrum, Base, and Optimism?

For Externally Owned Accounts (EOAs with zero bytecode), YES—the private key is identical. For older counterfactual Gnosis Safe proxies deployed via nonce-based CREATE (not deterministic CREATE2), different deployer nonces famously caused the 20M OP Wintermute address mismatch!

Publication record

Published
November 12, 2026
Updated
November 14, 2026
Author
Dr. Devon Kurosawa, PhD
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Dr. Devon Kurosawa, PhD. (2026, November 14). Blockchain Entity Resolution: Common-Input Ownership, CEX Deposit Reuse & False-Positive Guards. NFTVenue Ledger. https://nftvenueledger.com/protocols/entity-resolution-common-input-deposit-address-reuse-heuristics
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